In this paper we conjecture that the weak association between disclosure and cost of equity capital found in the literature (Botosan, 1997) can be caused by the high level corporate disclosure environment found in the US. We hypothesize that in low level corporate disclosure environments the variability in disclosure practices across firms will be larger than in the US and consequently the marginal effect of voluntary disclosure policies will be higher.
INTRODUCTION
There is an important strand of the financial accounting literature which investigates the relation between disclosure and cost of equity capital (Botosan, 1997; Botosan and Plumlee, 2002; Hail, 2002; Francis et al., 2005; Chen et al., 2003) . The basic idea is that higher levels of disclosure contribute to reduce information asymmetry between managers and investors and consequently cause a reduction in the idiosyncratic component of cost of equity capital (Verrechia, 2001; Diamond and Verrechia, 2001 ). However, results of these investigations have not been conclusive (Botosan, 1997) . Some authors like (Hail, 2002) argue that the absence of statistical and economically significant associations between disclosure and cost of capital can be the result of measurement problems because both variables are not directly observed and proxies need to be used. In this paper we investigate another possibility. We conjecture that the weak relation between firm-level disclosure measures and cost of equity capital is not significant in the US because the overall disclosure level is already high and firm-level actions do not have a significant marginal impact. We hypothesize that corporate governance arrangements at the firm-level and especially disclosure are more relevant for firms immersed in poor governance and institutional environments (Chong and Lopez-deSilanes, 2007) as previous research has suggested.
Recent research (Chong and Lopez-de-Silanez, 2007 ) has shown that firm-level corporate governance arrangements, including disclosure and transparency, are more likely to have a significant impact on valuation and performance for firms based on less developed markets.
They argue that some firms immersed in poor institutional environments may have incentives to differentiate themselves in order to attract foreign sources of funds. This situation makes firm-level arrangements more important for firms based in emerging markets than for firms domiciled in developed countries with strong equity and debt markets. Doidge et al. (2006) has shown that firms immersed in poor governance environments may choose to present superior governance standards in order to access foreign capital if they have growth opportunities in need of finance. Controlling shareholders of firms with good prospects are likely to voluntarily reduce their private benefits of control by adopting more rigid governance standards in order to access funds to finance profitable projects. Our hypothesis is that firms with good prospects immersed in poor governance regimes will have strong incentives to differentiate themselves from their country's norm and present additional and reliable disclosures in order to facilitate monitoring and consequently access external sources of capital. To investigate this question we need a setting where firms are immersed in a low quality disclosure environment but with sufficient incentives to differentiate themselves.
According to previous research (Lopes and Walker, 2008) we believe Brazil provides an ideal setting to perform this study.
One could argue about the relevance of a single country analysis. Recent cross-sectional studies (Francis et al., 2005) investigated the relation between disclosure indexes and cost of equity capital for a sample of firms extracted from 34 countries. We believe that more detailed within-country studies can complement the results of cross-country investigations.
We believe there is considerable sample selection bias in the databases used in recent work. In Francis et al. (2005) , for example, only 10 Brazilian firms are covered and there is no discussion about sample selection procedures and representativeness. Other studies which investigate corporate governance arrangements across a large number of firms have the same problem. Doidge et al. (2006) consider only 28 Brazilian firms of which 14 are cross-listed. Lang et al (2006) only consider 1 Brazilian firm. We believe these small and biased samples can compromise the results.
To investigate our hypothesis we decided to build a detailed disclosure index and apply it to a more representative sample of firms listed in Brazil. To proxy for disclosure we built the Brazilian Disclosure Index (BCDI) which measures disclosure across six components and 47 specific attributes. The index is applied to the 50 most liquid shares traded on the São Paulo Stock Exchange (BOVESPA) for the 1998, 2000, 2002, 2004, 2005 years. The index is based on a set of questions used in previous research (Botosan, 1997; Hail, 2002) and adaptations to reflect Brazilian regulations and accounting standards. Exhibit 1 shows the questionnaire and the percent of positive answers. Our questionnaire was not sent to the firms or to analysts; rather it is based on objective answers obtained from public sources of information -annual reports, websites, BOVESPA fillings and the files obtained from the Brazilian Securities and Exchange Commission (CVM). Answers are binary (0/1) with 1 for positive and 0 for negative answers. We believe that BCDI provides a comprehensive picture of corporate disclosure policies in Brazil. We are not aware of a detailed investigation of disclosure policies done outside the US. To measure cost of equity capital we used the model proposed by Ohlson and Juettner-Nauroth (2005) and used in previous papers (Francis et al., 2005) .
Our main analysis reveals that disclosure levels measured by the BCDI are negatively associated with cost of equity capital for our sample of Brazilian firms using a panel data specification and several control variables as suggested by Larcker and Rusticus (2005) and Nikolaev and van Lent (2005) . This result shows a more significant association between voluntary disclosure actions and cost of capital for firms immersed in the low disclosure Brazilian regime than previously found in the US. Additionally we investigate the relation between the six BCDI components and cost of capital. Interestingly, results show that the relation between disclosure of non-financial information is positively related to cost of capital.
One possible explanation for this result is that firms can reveal proprietary valuable Capa Boas Apresentação Diretoria Avaliadores Prêmio Programa Patrocinadores Informações Autores Áreas Títulos information about their business activities through voluntary disclosure of non-financial information (Verrechia, 2001 ).
We also investigate whether the effect of disclosure on cost of equity is less pronounced for firms which receive less analyst coverage. We hypothesize that disclosure and analyst coverage act as substitutes and the effect of disclosure on firms' cost of equity capital is less pronounced for firms which receive more attention from analysts. Our results confirm this hypothesis and show that the impact of disclosure on cost of equity is three times higher for firms with lower coverage. Our results are robust for controlling for cross-listing. An increase of one point in BCDI causes a reduction of 9 basis points in cost of equity for firms that receive more coverage from analysts and 26 basis points decrease for firms that receive less coverage. In addition, we examine the impact of ownership concentration on the relation between disclosure and cost of capital. We expect disclosure to be less important for firms with higher ownership concentration. Controlling shareholders have direct access to insider information and do not depend on public disclosures. The results confirm our expectationsan increase of one point in BCDI causes a reduction of 27 basis points in cost of capital for firms with low ownership concentration. For firms with high ownership concentration the relation is not statistically significant. Furthermore, we examine the impact of firm's BCDI levels on the relation between BCDI and cost of capital and found that BCDI scores are positively associated with the relation between disclosure and cost of capital. Finally, we investigate the likely determinants of BCDI scores and found as expected that growth opportunities and board composition are positively related with the association between disclosure and cost of capital.
We contribute directly to the literature on the relation between disclosure and cost of capital (Botosan, 1997; Botosan and Plumlee, 2002; Hail, 2002; Francis et al., 2005) by showing that high disclosure levels are strongly associated with lower cost of capital for firms immersed in poor institutional and corporate governance regimes. Previous research in this topic has been based on samples of firms originated from developed countries. Our paper is the first to perform a comprehensive investigation of the relation between disclosure and cost of capital for firms immersed in poor governance and institutional regimes. Our paper also contributes to recent research which investigates the determinants of the actual properties of accounting reports (Ball et al., 2000; Ball and Shivakumar, 2005) which suggests that financial reporting practices depend on managers' incentives to provide informative numbers and not on standards and regulations. This literature, however, is silent about the effect of firm-level actions designed to improve the quality of financial reports. We show that financial reporting practices of firms with incentives to produce high quality reports reduce significantly their cost of equity capital even under inimical circumstances.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 motivates the paper and develops the hypothesis; section 3 details the research design employed; section 4 shows the data selection process, the construction of the BCDI and presents the results of our econometric specifications; section 5 concludes the paper. which will have to increase their disclosure level in order to comply with the regulation will be N 1 . N 1 is higher than N 2 which is the number of firms which will have to increase their disclosure level if the regulator chooses d l . Because disclosure is costly when the disclosure level required is above the optimal, firms will migrate to the minimum disclosure required.
II. MOTIVATION AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT
Firms will only provide disclosure above the minimum required if it is optimum for them In this hypothetical market the variance of the disclosure policies actually adopted converge to zero as the disclosure level required grows to very high levels. If the regulator assumes a disclosure requirement above all firms' optimal disclosure policy (d hh ) every firm will migrate to this new pattern and the variance of the disclosure policies adopted will go to zero.
The above analysis shows that when the firm's environment demands superior disclosure levels there will be a lower variation in disclosure policies adopted by firms. As the variation in cost of capital is influenced by other factors, a lower variance in disclosure policies adopted by firms is likely to result in poor relation between disclosure and cost of capital. We expect to see a more pronounced relation between disclosure and cost of capital when the cross-sectional variation in disclosure is higher (ceteris paribus).
Previous research has found weak evidence of association between disclosure and cost of equity capital in the US (Botosan, 1997) . We conjecture that these findings may be a natural result of the high level disclosure environment found in the American market. We hypothesize that voluntary disclosure actions taken by firms may be more relevant in countries where the general environment is not so developed. Therefore we expect the relation between disclosure and cost of equity capital to be more pronounced in less developed markets with poor quality corporate financial reporting environments. We believe Brazil provides a unique laboratory to investigate this question. 
III. RESEARCH DESIGN
Research relating disclosure and cost of capital possesses important methodological problems because neither disclosure nor cost of capital (ks hereafter) can be directly observed.
Our major econometric specification follows the functional model proposed by Botosan (1997) and also used by Hail (2002) and Francis et al. (2005) :
Which is implemented using the following panel data model:
where ks is the cost of equity capital calculated according to the Ohlson and JuettnerNauroth (2005) 
model for firm i on year t; DISCL is the score on the Brazilian Corporate Disclosure Index for firm i on year t; ADR is a dummy variable which assumes the value of 1

Capa Boas Apresentação Diretoria Avaliadores Prêmio Programa Patrocinadores Informações Autores Áreas Títulos if the firm i is cross-listed on year t and zero otherwise; DE is the debt-to-equity ratio for firm i on year t; SIZE is the natural logarithm of total assets for firm i on year t; BETA is the market beta for firm i on year t; MB is the market-to-book ratio for firm i on year t; DYEAR is a year dummy variables included in all specifications.
The reasoning for this set of controls is the following. Initially, ADR controls for cross-listing because firms that cross list have to obey to more strict disclosure rules required by the American SEC. In this work we are investigating the marginal impact of voluntary disclosure actions taken by managers on cost of capital -we are not dealing with mandatory disclosures required by the Brazilian or foreign authorities. DE measures the level of indebtedness of each firm because it's likely to be related to cost of equity -more leveraged firms are likely to exhibit higher cost of capital. SIZE controls for firms' size because we expect larger firms to be less risk than small ones; BETA controls for the market component of firms' cost of capital. In this paper we are investigating the impact of disclosure on the idiosyncratic component of cost of equity capital; MB is a proxy for firms' risk and growth opportunities and is also likely to be related to cost of equity capital. DYEAR controls for year specific events. We believe that with this set of controls we address the concerns expressed by Ruland et al. (2007) for same-country studies.
The main methodological problem in our work refers to measuring cost of equity capital (ks) and disclosure (DISC). To measure ks we adopt the same methodology proposed by Hail and Leuz (2005) over 47 questions with binary answers being 1 for answers considered to be good disclosure and 0 otherwise. BCDI was built based on the indexes used by Botosan (1997 ), Hail (2002 and Francis et al. (2005) along with some adaptation to the Brazilian environment. The index computation did not depend on interviews or questionnaires and is based on public sources of information including firm's websites, BOVESPA files and annual reports. Table 1 presents the questions and percentage of good (1) answers. Each firm's score is based on a simple mean of the answers obtained on the 47 questions -we found no theoretical support to adopt different weights.
IV. DATA AND RESULTS
The BCDI was applied to the 50 shares with higher liquidity (trading volume) on BOVESPA on December 2005. We decided to work only with the most liquid shares because our cost of capital metric depends on stock prices and consequently can be biased by illiquid Table 1 . (Botosan, 1997 and Francis et al., 2005) . This result corroborates our hypothesis that lower levels of required disclosure will result in higher variance in the disclosure levels adopted by firms. Interestingly the statistics for the cost of capital estimated for our Brazilian sample are similar to the results of Botosan (1997) for the US. For the regression analysis which are performed on sequence these results are important. They show that the most significant difference between our sample and the US sample used by Botosan (1997) is not on the dependent variable (cost of equity capital) but rather on the major independent variable (disclosure score) as we expected. These results eliminate the possibility that a higher association between disclosure and cost of capital in Brazil than in the US is caused by more disperse cost of capital estimates.
INSERT TABLE 1 HERE
INSERT TABLE 2 HERE
Correlations presented on table 3 confirm our expectations except for the beta that we expected to have a positive and significant relation to ks. Table 4 
INSERT TABLES 3 AND 4 HERE
We investigate the relation between ks and BCDI and the results are presented on Table 5 which shows robust coefficients estimated using a panel data method for our sample. 
INSERT TABLES 5 AND 6 HERE
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To investigate the role played by analyst coverage in the relation between disclosure and cost of capital we split our sample between firms with high and low analyst coverage and show that these results are mainly driven by firms with low coverage. Results presented in Table 7 show that for firms with low analyst coverage an increase of one point in BCDI results in a reduction of 26 basis points in cost of capital. For firms with high analyst coverage this impact is much lower (9 basis points) and is of weak statistical significance. These results are consistent with previous literature (Botosan, 1997) and show that disclosure and analyst following act as substitutes in reducing information asymmetry.
INSERT TABLE 7 HERE
Additionally, we investigate the impact of ownership concentration on the relation between disclosure and cost of equity capital. Brazil is a code law country with weak investor protection and poor law enforcement (Durnev and Kim, 2005; Chong and Lopez-de-Silanes, 2007; Lopes and Walker, 2008) with high ownership concentration as expected -previous research has shown that ownership concentration is a natural response to poor protection environments (La Porta et al., 2000; . Thus we believe that ownership concentration is one of the most distinguishing aspects of the Brazilian environment when compared to the US. We believe that ownership concentration has important effect on the relation between disclosure and cost of capital. High ownership concentration reduces the demand for public reports because controlling shareholders have insider access to information about the firm.
High ownership concentration also means that firms will rely on insider deals to obtain finance usually with banks reducing the importance of financial statements in general and Capa Boas Apresentação Diretoria Avaliadores Prêmio Programa Patrocinadores Informações Autores Áreas Títulos particularly disclosure. Thus we expect the relation between disclosure and cost of capital to be less pronounced for high ownership concentration firms.
To investigate this aspect in detail we split our sample between firms where the controlling shareholder has more than 50% of the voting shares and firms where they do not.
This cut-off value may seem too high but reflect the high ownership concentration level in Brazil. Our main hypothesis is that disclosure will have a superior impact for firms with more dispersed ownership structures. Firms with highly concentrated structures will probably base their financing on insider deals and private relationships -in this situation creditors will not value superior disclosure levels because they can assure access to private sources of information. We expect more dispersed firms to rely more on public credit and equity markets to fund their activities what will increase the usefulness of disclosure to reduce information asymmetry. Results presented on Table 8 confirm our hypothesis and show that the relation between disclosure and cost of capital is more pronounced for firms with more dispersed ownership structures. For these firms an increase of one point on BCDI results in a reduction of 27 basis points in cost of capital. For firms with more ownership concentration this relation is not statistically significant.
INSERT TABLE 8 HERE
One could argue about the relative importance of BCDI levels on the relation between disclosure and cost of capital. Is this relation more pronounced for high disclosure or low disclosure firms? We expect firms with higher disclosures on BCDI to exhibit a stronger relation between disclosure and cost of capital because BCDI measures voluntary disclosure actions and firms with higher scores are committing themselves to more transparency. To answer this question we split our samples between firms with BCDI scores above 0.4 and Tables 5, 6 , 7, 8 and 9 convey an important message: the association between disclosure and cost of equity capital is not uniform but depends on firms' characteristics. More specifically, disclosure policies undertaken voluntarily at the firm-level are more effective to reduce cost of equity capital for firms with lower analyst coverage, lower ownership concentration and higher disclosure levels. Taken together these results reinforce the notion that firm-level attributes play a significant role on the effectiveness of disclosure to reduce cost of capital. Our research design allow for control of all institutional arrangements because all firms are immersed in the Brazilian poor governance and disclosure environment.
It's interesting to compare our results with Francis et al. (2005) . They start their investigation with a sample of 34 countries. However, when they investigate the relation between disclosure and cost of capital the sample is reduced to 22 countries mainly by excluding less developed countries (Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Greece, India, Israel, Mexico, Nigeria, Philippines, Sri Lanka and Zimbabwe). They found a very small relation disclosure and cost of capital for the remaining sample of developed countries. Their coefficients (results on Table 7 of Francis et al., 2005) on regressing disclosure on ex-ante cost of equity capital are -0.005 (using ordinary least square estimators) and -0.018 (using two-stage least squares).
These coefficients are much smaller than the coefficients found in our total sample (-0.14 in Table 5 ) and even smaller for the subsample of low analyst coverage (-0.26 in Table 7 ) and low ownership concentration (-0.27 in Table 8 ). The coefficients in Francis et al. (2005) are also less statistically significant than ours. Comparing our results with Botosan (1997) and 5 Our results are consistent over other cut-off values.
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Hail (2002) yields identical conclusions. Summarizing, the comparisons of our results with Francis et al. (2005) , Botosan (1997) and Hail (2002) suggests that disclosure policies are more effective to reduce cost of capital in Brazil than in more developed countries.
One limitation of our analysis is that we are comparing studies performed in several countries using different methodologies. The ideal research design would be to apply a comprehensive disclosure index to a representative sample of firms from several countries. Francis et al. (2005) results are limited by the small sample of firms covered by the CIFAR index. Single country studies like ours, Botosan (1997) and Hail (2002) work with more representative samples but lack the international comparison. To significantly advance the research in this topic new more comprehensive databases must be developed.
INSERT TABLE 9 HERE
Additionally, we also investigate the likely determinants of BCDI scores. In table 10 we present the results of a multivariate specification designed to investigate the impact of the usual variables used to proxy for high disclosure quality and two additional variables. We include the score on the Board Composition and Functioning component of the Brazilian
Corporate Governance Index (BCGI) used by Lopes and Walker (2008) . This score measures board independence and it's likely to be correlated to superior disclosure levels. More independent boards are more likely to demand more informative financial reports and to constrain actions taken by managers to hide relevant information from minority shareholders.
We also investigate the role played by growth opportunities. We expect firms with superior growth opportunities to disclose more information in order to facilitate monitoring by external investors. Results in that there is a significant negative association between disclosure and cost of equity capital for the firms in our sample. Additionally we show that this relation is more pronounced for firms which receive less attention from analysts and have dispersed ownership structures. For these firms an increase of one point in BCDI results in a reduction of 26 (for firms with less coverage) and 27 (for firms with dispersed ownership) basis points in cost of capital. We also investigate the impact of BCDI scores on the relation between disclosure and cost of capital.
Results show that the relation is more pronounced for firms with higher disclosure levels as expected.
Our results are important to a significant audience. To financial executives it shows that increased levels of disclosure result in inferior cost of capital especially for firms which receive less attention from analysts. For regulators our paper demonstrates that firms with superior growth opportunities will adopt better disclosure practices voluntarily even if they are immersed in poor governance and accounting regimes. We also contribute to a recent Capa Boas Apresentação Diretoria Avaliadores Prêmio Programa Patrocinadores Informações Autores Áreas Títulos strand of the international accounting literature which investigates the determinants of the actual properties of actual reports. This literature (Ball et al, 2000; Ball and Shivakumar, 2005) has shown that the properties of published accounting numbers depend more on incentives managers face to provide informative numbers than on standards and regulations. Our results go on the same direction and confirm the hypothesis that firm-level incentives also play a significant role on firms' financial reporting practices. 1998, 2000, 2002, 2004 and 2005 This table presents Pearson correlations among the variables used in this study.*, **, *** means that the correlations are statistically significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. Index; SIZE is the natural logarithm of total assets; MB measures the market to book ratio; BETA is the stock market beta; DE is the debt-to-equity ratio; ADR is a dummy variable which equals 1 if the firm is cross-listed and zero otherwise. We also include but did not report the results of year dummy variables. This table presents the results of a panel data model relating BCDI (dependent) on its determinants. BCDI refers to the score on the Brazilian Corporate Disclosure Index; SIZE is the natural logarithm of total assets; MB measures the market to book ratio; BETA is the stock market beta; DE is the debt-to-equity ratio; ADR is a dummy variable which equals 1 if the firm is cross-listed and zero otherwise; GROWTH is a proxy for growth opportunities and it's measured as defined in equation 4; BOARD is the score on Board Composition and Functioning component of the Brazilian Corporate Governance Index (BCGI). We also include but did not report the results of year dummy variables.
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